Owners calculate slot costs and pricing is done on yield management per container. With enough volume, the big ships and big ports make sense. A string of mega ships in the  post-post panamax class (too big even for the expanded Panama Canal) calling at a very small number of ports  on virtually a point-to-point service takes us back to the rationale of container shipping in the 1960s when a new containership of 1,250 teu  replaced four conventional breakbulk vessels. A revolution in its time no less  than that we face today.

The economies of scale, however, are  such that these behemoths are hostage to two basic trades centered on China;  one to North Europe and the other to the US West Coast. The planning going into today’s attempts to manage supply  becomes mind boggling with strings of 11,000 teu ships. In the planning for these ships and ports, has anyone contemplated the risks associated with these investments  exceeding billions of dollars? Have we forgotten about recessions or the  outbreak of a major new conflict? How long can operators survive if trade collapses for six months, or a year, or more? Does anyone remember the panic in 2001 and the dramatic loss of revenues? How short our collective memories are.

BEN HACKETT