At Madrid your wine gets scanned for the fourth and last time. Why? Because for some strange reason when you get to Madrid, even though you are just a transit passenger connecting internally to another flight, all your hand luggage gets scanned again and at this point you are advised you can’t take liquids on a connecting plane and so your lovely bottle of plonk is dropped unceremoniously into a huge bin crammed with bottles of spirits, wines, beers, perfumes and anything else that has probably made the effort of travelling three or thousand miles to get there!

This situation was also amplified at a recent meeting the writer attended overseas where the hosts of the meeting were kind enough to give to everyone a very nice bottle of wine as a thank you for participating in the event. Travelling back to the hotel with a few fellow participants a big conversation ensued in the taxi – “where are you going back to? Do you fly direct, oh OK you might as well take my bottle as I have to change flights and they will take my wine off me if I take it as hand luggage.” Various bottles of wine swiftly changed hands and the direct flight guys were the smiling beneficiaries.

So scanning and the knock-on effect of scanning, what seems to be a convoluted logic all of its own, is now a factor almost in everyday life. Just as it is increasingly becoming one in the international port business – and again convoluted logic is to the fore. Take for example, the situation rumoured to be afoot in the port of Maputo, Mozambique, where scanning is seen by the government as a means of making a real contribution to its re-election fund. Reportedly, nearly everything is being scanned in Maputo nowadays with the positive for government that it is a significant revenue generator but the negative for the port that this is adversely impacting efficiency levels. The main goal of enhancing port security seems to have been lost along the way.

We also see the “mad scanning factor” in the plans of the US to require the scanning of all US-bound containers in foreign ports within five years. Leaving aside the reality that such a requirement will bite deep into the short capacity reserves of many foreign ports and that it will also hit importers where it hurts most, in the pockets, this decision completely ignores the predictive powers that underpin the best security systems. A simple example: the container scanning systems employed in Algeciras, Spain receive sample containers based a/ on random sampling but also b/ as a result of the knowledge and expertise of the security professionals who are able to identify potentially suspect containers – carrying arms, drugs, people or other banned commodities. It is these experts, and their skill, some of which but not all has been obtained as a result of container scanning, that are really in the front line against abuse of the international container transportation system. The tools they use – of which container scanning is only one – are really only maximised through their skills.

If there is any doubt about this then like the writer just spend an hour or so and watch how these experts use container scanning systems and interpret what they see with them. Similarly, listen to their most enlightening tales of what constitute containers with suspect profiles and you will begin to understand that there is a wealth of knowledge that has to underpin effective container scanning. OK, you may say, but scanning all hand luggage at airports has proved an effective deterrent. The answer to this is simple: a container is somewhat bigger than a suitcase and hence requires more powers of detection by the operator.

In short, has anyone really sat down and thought whether scanning all containers imported to the US will prove to be a really effective security measure? Volume always has a way of diminishing quality and so perhaps the moral of this story is that less could well prove to be more.