Are you taking the TWIC?
The Transport Workers' Identification Credential is not winning friends. Credit: USCG
Back in the early days after the attrocities of September 11, 2001, one of my business ventures was the recipient of a Round 1 Port Security grant from what became the TSA, the body behind the TWIC ID scheme.
Ten years on, and I have to admit that I was only half surprised to find out recently that TWIC was still not functioning as intended. One titbit that I picked up around the waterfront in a major East Coast port, was that the mandated card readers, ill-suited to an outdoor environment, were tied to someone else’s business venture: the son of a Congressman.
Not too long ago, I saw someone asked to produce a valid photo ID, such as a driver's license or passport, after attempting to use a TWIC ID card to go through airport security. The TWIC, in widespread use since 2009 with nearly two million holders, is supposed to function first as a “flash-pass” (photo ID), albeit in the maritime realm, supplemented by the biometric ID. So this episode stuck in my mind.
In America, there is always tension between Federal activities and those of individual states, municipalities, or regional authorities. Because 9-11 was a Black Swan type event, it called for responses that were outside the realm of normal paradigms. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one example.
An antipathy to things like National ID cards (or standardised driver's licenses) is deeply ingrained in the American psyche. So, aside from card readers stalled by snow, rain and humidity, there’s also been a lack of political will to properly implement the TWIC.
A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a watchdog agency that often blows the whistle on wasteful activities, confirmed the obvious. For perspective, the TWIC program has cost over $400m so far, and could cost $4bn (mostly from the private sector) in the next decade and that's not including card readers.
The GAO found that cards could be obtained by presenting fake documents; and that background verification protocols were lacking. The GAO commented: “DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility specific identity credentials with business cases.”
This New Yorker does not like to complain, but it really comes down to political leadership. Port security is serious business, and perhaps the 10th anniversary of 9-11 is the time for some serious people from the intelligence community to be given a mandate to stealthily and speedily fix the problems.
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