The wider take-up of so-called Multi-Criteria Analysis bid processes \u2013 requiring bidders to submit both Technical and Financial \u2018envelopes\u2019 as opposed to just a financial bid \u2013 has contributed a lot to strengthening the integrity of the bid processes for maritime terminals, particularly in emerging markets.<\/p>\n
The technical element requires bidders to set out detailed plans on key aspects such as forecast demand, development plans and capital expenditure over the lifetime of the concession, and bidders are typically given marks against key technical criteria which contribute to an overall score when looked at alongside the financial bid element. Practically speaking, this makes it more difficult for any \u2018fiddling\u2019 with the financial bid element to take place.<\/p>\n
That is not to say that there are no longer attempts to influence the outcome of bid processes; one typical tactic is to gazump the Preferred Bidder with offers to pay more for the concession. This is when it can help to have the bid process overseen by independent business advisors or by an arms\u2019 length agency of government set up specifically to deter \u2018outside influences\u2019.<\/p>\n
Recent history confirms that only a few (multi-bidder) marine terminal concessions have been identified as subject to improper influence. There has recently been retrospective action taken in this respect in conjunction with concessions in Togo and Guinea, albeit that the alleged improper actions date back to around a decade ago. Specifically, billionaire dealmaker Vincent Bollore and Gilles Alix, chief executive of the Bollore Group, were placed under formal investigation in April this year, although it should be stressed that they do remain presumed innocent until proven otherwise.<\/p>\n
The Bollore case breaks new ground in France and it is significant that it follows on from the so-called Sapin II law, enacted at the end of 2016, which requires French companies to take preventative measures against graft as well as strengthening existing measures that enable punishment of corrupt practices used to win public contracts abroad.<\/p>\n
This type of more rigorous anti-corruption legislation is becoming more commonplace and it promises to play a larger role in the ports sector across the board.<\/p>\n
DPW under the spotlight<\/strong><\/p>\n There is an argument based on recent experience, and notably that of DP World in conjunction with the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti, now the subject of an acrimonious dispute with the Government of Djibouti, that concessions obtained without a public tender process are more at risk. The checks and balances inherent to a public tender process, where multiple bidders are involved, are absent.<\/p>\n DPW\u2019s new concession in Ecuador has recently come under strong fire from Ecuadorian investigative whistle-blower media, Plan<\/em> V<\/em>. It points out that while one to-one negotiation is allowed under the constitution of Ecuador between nation states it was not correct to take this route with DPW as it is not wholly-owned by Dubai but also has private investors owning equity in the company. \u201cThey violated Article 297 of the Constitution,\u201d Plan<\/em> V<\/em> alleges.<\/p>\n Plan V<\/em> also points out that the project still has political support despite a change of President and suggests that a key driver is that in supporting the project the new President, President Moreno, receives the influential support of Jamie Nebot, Mayor of Guayaquil. Indicative of this unorthodox support, claims Plan V<\/em>, is the sacking of Guido Ferreti, manager of the Port Authority of Guayaquil, from his job on the very same day he presented a Memorandum to the Minister of Transport and Public Works highlighting the Posorja project\u2019s irregularities, recommending a \u201cspecial examination by the State Attorney General\u2019s Office\u201d.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The ethics of maritime terminal concession awards and operations have been put under the spotlight recently.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":270,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[],"sponsor":[],"class_list":["post-269","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-post-script"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/269","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=269"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/269\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":271,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/269\/revisions\/271"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/270"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=269"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=269"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=269"},{"taxonomy":"sponsor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.portstrategy.com\/coastlink\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/sponsor?post=269"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}