A sense of balance

Security is a balancing act: staff training has to match the incoming technology and the system should streamline operations, rather than demand a new layer of input.

So, if you are putting in a wireless system, based on CCTV with coded video algorithm alarms operating over a narrow bandwidth, operators might not need to absorb as much in the way of training as other systems may demand.

On the other hand, Tim Manhire of Digital Barriers points out that although you might want to take some of the onus off the operatives via a sophisticated programme, “there are systems that are just too high-tech for the particular location – and simply won’t have the backup to work over a long period”.

“There are issues around repair, maintenance and viability: if you are putting a computer-based system into a place in Africa, you need a service contract that gives adequate provision for keeping these computers on line – which may not be that easy,” he says.

The problem is partially that ports have often had to ‘recreate the wheel’ by themselves, not least because there’s a lot of variation as to how the subject is treated from region to region, and even inside Europe there are widely divergent applications of the rules.

Research from BMT Group points out that the introduction of the ISPS Code, despite costing billions of dollars, is perceived as something which has provided little benefit – and there is often reluctance by terminal operators to invest money in security measures that do not directly protect their income. This is despite the fact that while individual security breaches may not cause much direct damage, the disruption can be very costly.

However, there’s an EU project, Security Upgrade for Ports (SUPPPORT) that is trying to take some of the sting out of the business. As part of the project, BMT is working to iron out the lumps, and see if there’s an economy of scale to be had by putting together a number of cost-effective options that can be worked up and cut to fit. However, it’s no small undertaking as it aims to develop different configurations for ports depending on their size, terminal types and ownership models.

Further, beyond embracing new software security upgrades including sensors and container management guidelines as these are developed, it also aims to include things like deception recognition software to spot vessels trying to evade tracking systems.

However, despite the initiative, Mr Manhire is not, altogether, without a natural degree of scepticism about any generalised system; giving one enough of a specific working over to be completely appropriate might mitigate against any efficiency gains. He says: “Security needs can vary dramatically from port to port, despite apparent similarities, so there may not be much room for a generic approach – there are so many variables.” He adds: “Since you’ve got to have a very careful evaluation of many different kinds of risk, by the end of it you have a very precisely tailored solution.”

As an example, Mr Manhire goes on to explain that a whole other layer surrounds the port’s relationship to the government. If the port in question is in a developing country that relies heavily on trade, it will probably have a large security input of some kind from the state that has to be worked with.

He concludes: “While ports may have similar attributes, they will have specific problems: what you don’t want is a weak point in your security system.”

On the other hand, Philip Roche of Norton Rose explains that while the landside and waterfront security in the port may be fairly tight, it is more difficult to secure the anchorages and roadsteads due to the large areas of water involved and this can be compounded by the high volume of small boat traffic moving through the anchorage.

There may be a number of ports where security of the anchorage is insufficient in the face of explicit threats from the sea. He says: “When ships come in to the apparent safety of an anchorage, they are immediately more vulnerable due to the loss of manoeuvrability, less efficient lookout, the departure of security teams and the need to allow access to port officials and others. In many cases, the ship’s guard comes down and they become less well defended.”

While ships should protect themselves in this situation, ports themselves may need to start doing more – although this need not be an expensive step. He adds: “Often ports are much better off by beginning with putting a few more security procedures in place rather than investing in high tech equipment.”

However, he says even here there are simple actions which can make a difference: “For example, just organising anchorages so that they are easier to guard, urging ships to maintain anti-piracy deterrents and making sure that ships know precisely when port officials will visit so that pirates disguised as such officials cannot bluff their way onboard.”